Abstract. We propose a general security definition for cryptographic quantum protocols that implement classical non-reactive two-party tasks. The definition is expressed in terms of simple quantum-information-theoretic conditions which must be satisfied by the protocol to be secure. The conditions are uniquely determined by the ideal functionality F defining the cryptographic task to be implemented. We then show the following composition result. If quantum protocols π1, . . . , π securely implement ideal functionalities F1, . . . , F according to our security definition, then any purely classical two-party protocol, which makes sequential calls to F1, . . . , F , is equally secure as the protocol obtained by replacing the calls to F1, . . . , F with the respective quantum protocols π1, . . . , π . Hence, our approach yields the minimal security requirements which are strong enough for the typical use of quantum protocols as subroutines within larger classical schemes. Finally, we show that recently proposed quantum protocols for oblivious transfer and secure identification in the bounded-quantum-storage model satisfy our security definition, and thus compose in the above sense.
Introduction
Background. Finding the right security definition for a cryptographic task is a nontrivial fundamental question in cryptography. From a theoretical point of view, one would like definitions to be as strong as possible in order to obtain strong composability guarantees. However, this often leads to impossibility results or to very complex and inefficient schemes. Therefore, from a practical point of view, one may also consider milder security definitions which allow for efficient schemes, but still offer "good enough" security.
It is fair to say that in computational cryptography, the question of defining security and the trade-offs that come along with these definitions are by now quite well understood. The situation is different in quantum cryptography. For instance, it was realized only recently that the standard security definition of quantum key-agreement does not guarantee the desired kind of security and some work was required to establish the right security definition [GL03,RK05,BHL + 05, Ren05, KRBM07] . In [BM04, Unr04] , strong security definitions for general quantum protocols were proposed by translating Canetti's universalcomposability framework and Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner's reactive-simulatability model, respectively, into the quantum setting. The resulting security definitions are very strong and guarantee full composability. However, they are complex and hard to achieve. Indeed, so far they have been actually used and shown to be achievable only in a couple of isolated cases: quantum key distribution [BHL + 05] and quantum multi-party computation with dishonest minority [BCG + 05]. It is still common practice in quantum cryptography that every paper proposes its own security definition of a certain task and proves security with respect to the proposed definition. However, it usually remains unclear whether these definitions are strong enough to guarantee any kind of composability, and thus whether protocols that meet the definition really behave as expected.
Contribution. We propose a general security definition for quantum protocols that implement cryptographic two-party tasks. The definition is in terms of simple quantuminformation-theoretic security conditions that must be satisfied for the protocol to be secure. In particular, the definition does not involve additional entities like a "simulator" or an "environment". The security conditions are uniquely determined by the ideal functionality that defines the cryptographic task to be realized. Our definition applies to any non-reactive, classical ideal functionality F, which obtains classical (in the sense of non-quantum) input from the two parties, processes the provided input according to its specification, and outputs the resulting classical result to the parties. A typical example for such a functionality/task is oblivious transfer (OT). Reactive functionalities, i.e. functionalities that have several phases (like e.g. bit commitment), or functionalities that take quantum input and/or produce quantum output are not the scope of this paper.
We show the following composition result. If quantum protocols π 1 , . . . , π securely implement ideal functionalities F 1 , . . . , F according to our security definition, then any purely classical two-party protocol, which makes sequential calls to F 1 , . . . , F , is equally secure as the protocol obtained by replacing the calls to F 1 , . . . , F with the respective quantum subroutines π 1 , . . . , π . We stress that our composition theorem, respectively our security definition, only allows for the composition of quantum sub-protocols into a classical outer protocol. This is a trade-off which allows for milder security definitions (which in turn allows for simpler and more efficient implementations) but still offers security in realistic situations. Indeed, current technology is far from being able to execute quantum algorithms or protocols which involve complicated quantum operations and/or need to keep a quantum state "alive" for more than a tiny fraction of a second. Thus, the best one can hope for in the near future in terms of practical quantum algorithms is that certain small subroutines, like key-distribution or OT, may be implemented by quantum protocols, while the more complex outer protocol remains classical. From a more theoretical point of view, our general security definition expresses what security properties a quantum protocol must satisfy in order to be able to instantiate a basic cryptographic primitive upon which an information-theoretic cryptographic construction is based. For instance, it expresses the security properties a quantum OT 1 needs to satisfy so that Kilian's classical 2 construction of general secure function evaluation based on OT [Kil88] remains secure when instantiating the OT primitive by a quantum protocol. Alternatively, our security conditions can also be viewed as providing the minimal requirements for a quantum protocol to behave as expected.
Finally, we show that the ad-hoc security definitions proposed by Damgård, Fehr, Salvail and Schaffner for their 1-2 OT and secure-identification protocols in the boundedquantum-storage model [DFR + 07,DFSS07] imply (and are likely to be equivalent) to the corresponding security definitions obtained from our approach. 3 This implies composability in the above sense for these quantum protocols in the bounded-quantum-storage model. 1 We are well aware that quantum OT is impossible without any restriction on the adversary, but it becomes possible for instance when restricting the adversary's quantum memory [DFSS05,DFR + 07]. 2 Here, "classical" can be understood as "non-quantum" as well as "being a classic". 3 Interestingly, this is not true for the definition of Rabin OT given in the first paper in this line of research [DFSS05] , and indeed in the full version of that paper, it is mentioned that their definition poses some "composability problems" (this problem though has been fixed in the journal version [DFSS08] ). This supports our claim that failure of satisfying our security definition is strong evidence for a security problem of a quantum protocol.
Related work. In the classical setting, Crépeau, Savvides, Schaffner and Wullschleger proposed information-theoretic conditions for two-party secure function evaluation [CSSW06] , though restricted to the perfect case, where the protocol is not allowed to make any error. They show equivalence to a simulation-based definition that corresponds to the standard framework of Goldreich [Gol04] . Similar conditions have been subsequently found by Crépeau and Wullschleger for the case of non-perfect classical protocols [CW08] . Our work can be seen as an extension of [CSSW06, CW08] to the setting where classical subroutines are implemented by quantum protocols. As pointed out and discussed above, general frameworks for universal composability in the quantum setting have been established in [BM04, Unr04] . The composability of protocols in the bounded-quantum-storage model has recently been investigated by Wehner and Wullschleger [WW08] . They propose security definitions that guarantee sequential composability of quantum protocols within quantum protocols. This is clearly a stronger composition result than we obtain (though restricted to the bounded-quantum-storage model) but comes at the price of a more demanding security definition. And indeed, whereas we show that the simple definitions used in [DFSS05,DFR + 07] already guarantee composability into classical protocols without any modifications to the original parameters and proofs, [WW08] need to strengthen the quantum-memory bound (and re-do the security proof) in order to show that the 1-2 OT protocol from [DFR + 07] meets their strong security definition. As we argued above, this is an overkill in many situations.
Notation
Quantum States. We assume the reader's familiarity with basic notation and concepts of quantum information processing [NC00] .
Given a bipartite quantum state ρ XE , we say that X is classical if ρ XE is of the form ρ XE = x∈X P X (x)|x x| ⊗ ρ x E for a probability distribution P X over a finite set X . This can be understood in that the state of the quantum register E depends on the classical random variable X, in the sense that E is in state ρ x E exactly if X = x. For any event E defined by P E|X (x) = P [E|X = x] for all x, we may then write
(1)
When we omit registers, we mean the partial trace over these register, for instance ρ E|E = tr X (ρ XE|E ) = x P X|E (x)ρ x E , which describes E given that the event E occurs. This notation extends naturally to states that depend on several classical random variables X, Y etc., defining the density matrices ρ XY E , ρ XY E|E , ρ Y E|X=x etc. We tend to slightly abuse notation and write ρ x Y E = ρ XE|X=x and ρ x Y E|E = ρ Y E|X=x,E , as well as
. Given a state ρ XE with classical X, by saying that "there exists a classical random variable Y such that ρ XY E satisfies some condition", we mean that ρ XE can be understood as ρ XE = tr Y (ρ XY E ) for some state ρ XY E with classical X and Y , and that ρ XY E satisfies the required condition. 4 X is independent of E (in that ρ x E does not depend on x) if and only if ρ XE = ρ X ⊗ρ E , which in particular implies that no information on X can be learned by observing only E. Similarly, X is random and independent of E if and only if ρ XE = 1 |X | I ⊗ ρ E , where 1 |X | I is the density matrix of the fully mixed state of suitable dimension.
4 This is similar to the case of distributions of classical random variables where given X the existence of a certain Y is understood that there exists a certain joint distribution PXY with P y PXY (·, y) = PX .
We also need to express that a random variable X is independent of a quantum state E when given a random variable Y . This means that when given Y , the state E gives no additional information on X. Yet another way to understand this is that E is obtained from X and Y by solely processing Y . Formally, adopting the notion introduced in [DFSS07] , this is expressed by requiring that ρ XY E equals ρ X↔Y ↔E , where the latter is defined as
In other words, ρ XY E = ρ X↔Y ↔E precisely if ρ
x,y E = ρ y E for all x and y. This notation naturally extends to ρ X↔Y ↔E|E = x,y P XY |E (x, y)|x x| ⊗ |y y| ⊗ ρ y E|E . Full (conditional) independence is often too strong a requirement, and it usually suffices to be "close" to such a situation. Closeness of two states ρ and σ is measured in terms of their trace distance δ(ρ, σ) = 1 2 tr(|ρ − σ|), where for any operator A, |A| is defined as |A| := √ AA † . We write ρ ≈ ε σ to denote that δ(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, and we then say that ρ and σ are ε-close. It is known that ε-closeness is preserved under any quantum operation; this in particular implies that if ρ ≈ ε σ then no observer can distinguish ρ from σ with advantage greater than ε [RK05] . For states ρ XE and ρ X E with classical X and X , it is not hard to see that
In case of purely classical states ρ X and ρ X , the trace distance coincides with the statistical distance of the random variables X and X : δ(ρ X , ρ X ) = 1 2
x |P X (x) − P X (x)|, and we then write
We will make use of the following lemmas whose proofs are given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.3. For an event E which is completely determined by the random variable Y , i.e. for all y, the probability Pr[E|Y = y] either vanishes or equals one, we can decompose the density matrix ρ X↔Y ↔E into 5
Protocols and Functionalities
Quantum Protocols. We consider two-party quantum protocols π = (A, B), consisting of interactive quantum algorithms A and B. For convenience, we call the two parties who run A and B Alice and Bob, respectively. There are different approaches to formally define interactive quantum algorithms and thus quantum two-party protocols, in particular when we restrict in-and outputs (of honest participants) to be classical. For instance such a formalization can be done by means of quantum circuits, or by means of a classical Turing machine which outputs unitaries that are applied to a quantum register. For our work, the specific choice of the formalization is immaterial; what is important is that such a twoparty quantum protocol, formalized in whatever way, uniquely specifies its input-output behavior. Therefore, in this work, we capture quantum protocols by their input-output behavior, which we formalize by a quantum operation, i.e. a trace-preserving completelypositive map, which maps the common two-partite input state ρ U V to the common twopartite output state ρ XY . We denote this operation by ρ XY = π ρ U V or, when we want to emphasize that π is executed by honest Alice and Bob, also by ρ XY = π A,B ρ U V . If one of the players, say Bob, is dishonest and follows a malicious strategy B , then we slightly abuse notation and write π A,B for the corresponding operator.
Protocols and Functionalities with Classical In-and Output. In this work, we focus on quantum protocols π = (A, B) with classical in-and output for the honest players. This means that we assume the common input state ρ U V to be classical, i.e. of the form ρ U V = u,v P U V (u, v)|u u| ⊗ |v v| for some probability distribution P U V , and the common output state ρ XY = π A,B ρ U V is then guaranteed to be classical as well, i.e., ρ XY = x,y P XY (x, y)|x x| ⊗ |y y|. In this case we may understand U and V as well as X and Y as random variables, and we also write (X, Y ) = π(U, V ). Note that the inputoutput behavior of the protocol is uniquely determined by the conditional probability distribution P XY |U V . If one of the players, say Bob, is dishonest and follows a malicious strategy B , then we may allow his part of the input to be quantum and denote it as V , i.e. ρ U V = u P U (u)|u u| ⊗ ρ V |U =u , and we allow his part Y of the common output
has no input at all, and we write it as ρ U ZV if part of his input, Z, is actually classical. A classical non-reactive two-party ideal functionality F is given by a conditional probability distribution P F (U,V )|U V , inducing a pair of random variables (X, Y ) = F(U, V ) for every joint distribution of U and V . We also want to take into account ideal functionalities which allow the dishonest player some additional-though still limited-possibilities (as for instance in Section 6 or 7). We do this as follows. We specify F not only for the "proper" domains U and V, over which U and V are supposed to be distributed, but we actually specify it for some larger domainsŨ ⊇ U andṼ ⊇ V. The understanding is that U and V provided by honest players always lie in U and V, respectively, whereas a dishonest player, say Bob, may select V fromṼ \ V, and this way Bob may cause F, if specified that way, to process its inputs differently and/or to provide a "more informative" output Y to Bob. For simplicity though, we often leave the possibly different domains for honest and dishonest players implicit.
We write (X, Y ) = FÂ ,B (U, V ) or ρ XY = FÂ ,B ρ U V for the execution of the "ideallife" protocol, where Alice and Bob forward their inputs to F and output whatever they obtain from F. And we write ρ XY = FÂ ,B ρ U V for the execution of this protocol with a dishonest Bob with strategyB and quantum input V . Note that Bob's possibilities are very limited: he can produce some classical input V for F (distributed overṼ) from his input quantum state V , and then he can prepare and output a quantum state Y which might depend on F's reply Y .
Classical Hybrid Protocols. A two-party classical hybrid protocol Σ F 1 ···F = (Â,B) between Alice and Bob is a protocol which makes a bounded number k of sequential oracle calls to possibly different ideal functionalities F 1 , . . . , F . We allowÂ andB to make several calls to independent copies of the same F i , but we require from Σ F 1 ···F that for every possible execution, there is always agreement betweenÂ andB on when to call which functionality; for instance we may assume thatÂ andB exchange the index i before they call F i (and stop if there is disagreement).
Formally, such a classical hybrid protocol is given by a sequence of k + 1 quantum protocols formalized by quantum operators with classical in-and output for the honest players, see Figure 1 . For an honest player, say Alice, the j-th protocol outputs an index i indicating which functionality is to be called, classical auxiliary (or "state") information information S j and a classical input U j for F i . The (j + 1)-st protocol expects as input S j and Alice's classical output X j from F i . Furthermore, the first protocol expects Alice's classical input U to the hybrid protocol, and the last produces the classical output X of the hybrid protocol. In case of a dishonest player, say Bob, all in-and outputs may be quantum states V j respectively Y j . By instantiating the j-th call to a functionality F (where we from now on omit the index for simpler notation) in the obvious way by the corresponding "ideal-life" protocol FÂ ,B (respectively FÂ ,B or FÂ ,B in case of a dishonest Alice or Bob), we obtain the instantiated hybrid protocol formally described by quantum operator Σ
). 6 For the hybrid protocol to be classical, we mean that it has classical in-and output (for the honest players), but also that all communication between Alice and Bob is classical. 7 Since we have not formally modeled the communication within (hybrid) protocols, we need to formalize this property as a property of the quantum operators that describe the hybrid protocol: Consider a dishonest player, say Bob, with no input, and consider the common state ρ S j U j V j at any point during the execution of the hybrid protocol when a call to functionality F i is made. The requirement for the hybrid protocol to be classical is now expressed in that there exists a classical Z j -to be understood as consisting ofB 's classical communication witĥ A and with the F i 's up to this point-such that given Z j , Bob's quantum state V j is uncorrelated with (i.e. independent of) Alice' classical input and auxiliary information:
Furthermore, we require that we may assume Z j to be part of V j in the sense that for anyB there existsB such that Z j is part of V j . This definition is motivated by the observation that if Bob can communicate only classically with Alice, then he can correlate his quantum state with information on Alice's side only by means of the classical communication.
We also consider the protocol we obtain by replacing the ideal functionalities by quantum two-party sub-protocols π 1 , . . . , π with classical in-and outputs for the honest parties: whenever Σ F 1 ···F instructsÂ andB to execute F iÂ ,B , they instead execute π i = (A i , B i ) and take the resulting outputs. We write Σ π 1 ···π = (A, B) for the real quantum protocol we obtain this way.
Security for Two-Party Quantum Protocols

The Security Definition
Framework. We use the following framework for defining security of a quantum protocol π with classical in-and output. We distinguish three cases and consider the respective output states obtained by executing π in case of honest Alice and honest Bob, in case of honest Alice and dishonest Bob, and in case of dishonest Alice and honest Bob. For each of these cases we require some security conditions on the output state to hold. More precisely, for honest Alice and Bob, we fix an arbitrary joint probability distribution P U V for the inputs U and V , resulting in outputs (X, Y ) = π A,B (U, V ) with a well defined joint probability distribution P U V XY . For an honest Alice and a dishonest Bob, we fix an arbitrary distribution P U for Alice's input and an arbitrary strategy B with no input for Bob, and we consider the resulting joint output state
augmented with Alice's input U , where U and X are classical and Y is in general quantum. And, correspondingly, for a dishonest Alice and an honest Bob, we fix an arbitrary distribution P V for Bob's input and an arbitrary strategy A with no input for Alice, and we consider the resulting joint output state
augmented with Bob's input V . Then, security is defined by specific information-theoretic conditions on P U V XY , ρ U XY and ρ V X Y , where the conditions depend on the functionality F which π is implementing. Definition 4.1 below for a general functionality F, as well as the definitions studied later for specific functionalities (Definitions 6.1, 7.1 etc.), are to be understood in this framework. In particular, the augmented common output states are to be understood as defined above.
We stress once more that the framework assumes that dishonest players have no input at all. This might appear too weak at first glance; one would expect a dishonest player, say Bob, to at least get the input V of the honest Bob. The justification for giving dishonest players no input is that on the one hand, we will show that this "minimalistic approach" is good enough for the level of security we are aiming for (see Theorem 5.1), and on the other hand, our goal is to keep the security definitions as simple as possible.
Restricting the Adversary. Since essentially no interesting two-party task can be implemented securely by a quantum protocol against unbounded quantum attacks [May97,LC97,Lo97,Kit03], one typically has to put some restriction upon the dishonest player's capabilities. One such restriction, which proved to lead to interesting results, is to limit the quantum-storage capabilities of the dishonest player [DFSS05,DFR + 07,DFSS07,WST07], but one can also consider other restrictions like a bound on the size of coherent measurements dishonest players can do [Sal98] .
Throughout, we let A and B be subfamilies of all possible strategies A and B of a dishonest Alice and a dishonest Bob, respectively. In order to circumvent some pathological counter examples, we need to assume the following two natural consistency conditions on A, and correspondingly on B. If a dishonest strategy A ∈ A expects as input some state ρ ZU with classical Z, then for any z and for any ρ U |Z=z , the strategy A z,ρ U |Z=z , which has z hard-wired and prepares the state ρ U |Z=z as an initial step but otherwise runs like A , is in A as well. And, if A ∈ A is a dishonest strategy for a protocol Σ π which makes a call to a sub-protocol π, then the corresponding "sub-strategy" of A , which is active during the execution of π, is in A as well.
Defining Security. Following the framework described above, we propose the following security definition for two-party quantum protocols with classical in-and output. The justification for the proposed definition is that it implies strong simulation-based security when using quantum protocols as sub-protocols in classical outer protocols (Theorem 5.1), yet the definition is expressed in a way that is as simple and as weak as (seemingly) possible, making it as easy as possible to design and prove quantum cryptographic schemes secure according to the definition. Definition 4.1. A two-party quantum protocol π ε-securely implements an ideal classical functionality F against A and B if the following holds:
Correctness: For any joint distribution of the input U and V , the resulting common
Security for Alice: For any B ∈ B (with no input), and for any distribution of U , the resulting common output state ρ U XY (augmented with U ) is such that there exist 8 classical random variables V and Y such that
Security for Bob: For any A ∈ A (with no input), and for any distribution of V , the resulting common output state ρ V X Y (augmented with V ) is such that there exist classical random variables U and X such that
The three conditions for dishonest Bob (and similarly for dishonest Alice) express that, up to a small error, V is independent of U , X and Y are obtained by applying F, and the quantum state Y is obtained by locally processing V and Y .
Equivalent Formulations
As already mentioned, Definition 4.1 appears to guarantee security only in a very restricted setting, where the honest player has no information beyond his input, and the dishonest player has no (auxiliary) information at all. Below, we argue that Definition 4.1 actually implies security in a somewhat more general setting, where the dishonest player is allowed as input to have arbitrary classical information Z as well as a quantum state which only depends on Z. For completeness, although this is rather clear, we also argue that not only the honest player's input is protected, but also any classical "side information" S he might additionally have but does not use.
Proposition 4.2. Let π be a two-party protocol that ε-securely implements F against A and B. Let B ∈ B be a dishonest Bob who takes as input a classical Z and a quantum state V and outputs (the same) Z and a quantum state Y . Then, for any ρ SU ZV with ρ SU ZV = ρ SU ↔Z↔V , the resulting overall output state (augmented with S and U )
is such that there exist classical random variables V and Y such that
The corresponding holds for a dishonest Alice.
Proof. It is rather clear that we can extend the setting from Definition 4.1 by S: We can view S as an additional input to F, provided by Alice besides U , which is simply ignored by F. Definition 4.1 then immediately implies that the common output state ρ SU XY allows V and Y such that
Consider now a dishonest Bob who holds some classical auxiliary information Z. Applying Definition 4.1 with the above observation to the distribution P SU |Z=z and the dishonest Bob who has z hard-wired and locally prepares ρ V |S=s,U =u,Z=z = ρ V |Z=z implies that the conditioned common output state ρ SU XY |Z=z allows V and Y such that
As the above holds for any z, it follows that P SU ZV ≈ ε P SU ↔Z↔V ,
Note the restriction on the adversary's quantum input V , namely that it is only allowed to depend on the honest player's input U (and side information S) "through" Z. It is this limitation which prohibits quantum protocols satisfying Definition 4.1 to securely compose into outer quantum protocols but requires the outer protocol to be classical. Indeed, within a quantum protocol that uses quantum communication, a dishonest player may be able to correlate his quantum state with classical information on the honest player's side; however, within a classical protocol, he can only do so through the classical communication so that his state is still independent when given the classical communication.
The following proposition shows equivalence to a simulation-based definition; this will be a handy formulation in order to prove the composition theorem.
Proposition 4.3. Let π be a two-party protocol that ε-securely implements F against A and B. Let B ∈ B be a dishonest Bob who takes as input a classical Z and a quantum state V , engages into π with honest Alice and outputs Z and a quantum state Y . Then, for any ρ SU ZV with ρ SU ZV = ρ SU ↔Z↔V there existsB such that
Proof. Given that Z = z,B samples v according to the distribution P V |Z=z , and sends it to F in order to receive output y. Then,B prepares and outputs the quantum state ρ vyz Y . The resulting common output stateρ SU XZY (augmented with S and U ) is as follows.
Recall that FÂ ,B is the execution of the "ideal-life" protocol, where honestÂ relays inand outputs, and the only thing dishonestB can do is modify the input and the output. Note that we do not guarantee thatB is in B; we will comment on this after Theorem 5.1.
Composability
We show the following composition result. If quantum protocols π 1 , . . . , π securely implement ideal functionalities F 1 , . . . , F according to Definition 4.1, then any two-party classical hybrid protocol Σ F 1 ,...,F which makes sequential calls to F 1 , . . . , F is essentially equally secure as the protocol obtained by replacing the calls to F 1 , . . . , F by the respective quantum subroutines π 1 , . . . , π .
We stress that the F i 's are classical functionalities, i.e., even a dishonest playerÂ or B can only input a classical value to F i , and for instance cannot execute F i with several inputs in superposition. This makes our composition result stronger, because we give the adversary less power in the "ideal" (actually hybrid) world.
Theorem 5.1 (Composition Theorem). Let Σ F 1 ···F = (Â,B) be a classical two-party hybrid protocol which makes at most k oracle calls to the functionalities, and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , }, let protocol π i be an ε-secure implementation of F i against A and B. Then, the following holds.
Correctness: For every distribution of U and V δ Σ
Security for Alice: For every B ∈ B there existsB such that for every distribution of U δ Σ
Security for Bob: For every A ∈ A there existsÂ such that for every distribution of V δ Σ
Before going into the proof, we would like to point out the following observations. First of all, note that the quantification is such that the dishonest hybrid adversaryB (and correspondinglyÂ ) does not depend on the distribution of the honest player's input U , and as such we do not need to assume that the adversary knows the honest player's input distribution. Also note that in contrast to typical composition theorems, which per-se guarantee security when replacing one functionality by a sub-protocol and where in case of several functionalities security then follows by induction, Theorem 5.1 is stated in such a way that it directly guarantees security when replacing all functionalities by sub-protocols. The reason for this is that the assumption that the outer protocol is classical is not satisfied anymore once the first functionality is replaced by a quantum sub-protocol, and thus the inductive reasoning does not work directly. We stress that our composition theorem nevertheless allows for several levels of compositions (see Corollary 5.2 and the preceding discussion).
Furthermore, note that we do not guarantee that the dishonest hybrid adversaryB is in B (and similarly forÂ ). For instance the specificB we construct in the proof is more involved with respect to classical resources (memory and computation), but less involved with respect to quantum resources: essentially it follows B , except that it remembers all classical communication and except that the actions during the sub-protocols are replaced by sampling a value from some distribution and preparing a quantum state (of a size that also B has to handle); the descriptions of the distribution and the state have to be computed byB from the stored classical communication. By this, natural restrictions on B concerning its quantum capabilities propagate toB . For instance if B has a quantum memory of bounded size, so hasB . Furthermore, in many cases the classical hybrid protocol is actually unconditionally secure against classical dishonest players and as such in particular secure against unbounded quantum dishonest players (because every dishonest quantum strategy can be simulated by an unbounded classical adversary), so no restriction onB is needed.
Finally, note that we do not specify what it means for the hybrid protocol to be secure; Theorem 5.1 guarantees that whatever the hybrid protocol achieves, essentially the same is achieved by the real-life protocol with the oracle calls replaced by protocols. But of course in particular, if the hybrid protocol is secure in the sense of Definition 4.1, then so is the real-life protocol, and as such it could itself be used as a quantum sub-protocol in yet another classical outer protocol.
Corollary 5.2. If Σ F 1 ···F is a δ-secure implementation of G against A and B, and if π i is an ε-secure implementation of F i against A and B for every i ∈ {1, . . . , }, then Σ π 1 ···π is a (δ+3kε)-secure implementation of G.
Proof (of Theorem 5.1).
Correctness is obvious. We show security for Alice; security for Bob can be shown accordingly. Consider a dishonest B . First we argue that for every distribution for Alice's input U , there exists aB as claimed (which though may depend on P U ). Then, in the end, we show how to makeB independent of P U . Let A's input U be arbitrarily distributed. We prove the claim by induction on k. The claim holds trivially for protocols that make zero oracle calls. Consider now a protocol Σ F 1 ···F with at most k > 0 oracle calls. For simplicity, we assume that the number of oracle calls equals k, otherwise we instruct the players to makes some "dummy calls". Let ρ S k U k V k be the common state right before the k-th and thus last call to one of the subprotocols π 1 , . . . , π in the execution of the real protocol Σ π 1 ,...,π . To simplify notation in the rest of the proof, we omit the index k and write ρSŪV instead; see Figure 2 . We know from the induction hypothesis for k−1 that there existsB such that ρSŪV ≈ 3(k−1)ε σSŪV where σSŪV is the common state right before the k-th call to a functionality in the execution of the hybrid protocol Σ F 1 ···F Â ,B ρ U ∅ . As described in Section 3,S,Ū andV are to be understood as follows.S denotes A's (respectivelyÂ's) classical auxiliary information to be "remembered" during the call to the functionality.Ū denotes A's (respectivelyÂ's) input to the sub-protocol (respectively functionality) that is to be called next, andV denotes the dishonest player's current quantum state. For simplicity, we assume that the index i, which determines the sub-protocol π i (functionality F i ) to be called next, is fixed and we just write π and F for π i and F i , respectively. If this is not the case, we consider ρSŪV |Ī=i and σSŪV |Ī=i instead, and reason as below for any i, whereĪ denotes the index of the sub-protocol (functionality) to be called. Note that conditioning onĪ = i means that we allowB to depend on i, but this is legitimate sinceĪ is known to the dishonest party.
. Steps of the Composability Proof
Consider now the evolution of the state σSŪV when executing FÂ ,B (as prescribed by the hybrid protocol) with a strategy forB yet to be determined and when executing π A,B instead. Let σSXȲ and τSXȲ denote the corresponding states after the execution of respectively π A,B and FÂ ,B , see Figure 2 . We show that σSXȲ and τSXȲ are 3ε-close; this then proves the result by the fact that evolution does not increase the trace distance and by the triangle inequality:
Let σSŪZV , σSXZȲ and τSXZȲ be the extensions of the respective states σSŪV , σSXȲ and τSXȲ when we also considerZ (which collects the classical communication dictated by Σ F 1 ...,F as well asB 's classical inputs to and outputs from the previous oracle calls), which is guaranteed to exist by our formalization of a classical hybrid protocol, so thatZ is without loss of generality contained inV and σSŪZV = σSŪ ↔Z↔V . It thus follows from Proposition 4.3 that σSXZȲ and τSXZȲ are 3ε-close for a proper strategy ofB . Note that the strategy ofB may depend on the state σSŪZV , but since P U as well asÂ's behavior are fixed, σSŪZV is also fixed.
It remains to argue that we can makeB independent of P U . We use an elegant argument due to Crépeau and Wullschleger [CW08] . We know that for any P U there exists aB (though depending on P U ) as required. For any value u that U may take on, let then
Then, u P U (u)ε u = 3kε. The ε u 's depend on P U , and thus we also write ε u (P U ). Consider now the function F which maps an arbitrary distribution P U for U to a new distribution defined as F (P U )(u) := 1+εu(P U ) 1+3kε P U (u). Function F is continuous and maps a non-empty, compact, convex set onto itself. Thus, by Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, it must have a fixed point: a distribution P U with F (P U ) = P U , and thus ε u (P U ) = 3kε for any u. It follows thatB which works for that particular distribution P U in fact works for any specific value for U and so for any distribution of U .
Example: Secure Identification
We show that the information-theoretic security definition proposed by Damgård et al. for their secure-identification quantum protocol in the bounded-quantum-storage model [DFSS07] implies security in our sense for a proper functionality F ID ; this guarantees composability as in Theorem 5.1 for their protocol. In Section 7 and in Appendix B, we show the corresponding for the 1-2 OT scheme [DFR + 07] and for other variants of OT.
A secure identification scheme allows a user Alice to identify herself to server Bob by securely checking whether the supplied password agrees with the one stored by Bob. Specifically, on respective input strings W A , W B ∈ W provided by Alice and Bob, the functionality outputs the bit Y = (W A ? = W B ) to Bob. A dishonest server B should learn essentially no information on W A beyond that he can come up with a guess W for W A and learns whether W = W A or not, and similarly a dishonest user A succeeds in convincing Bob essentially only if she guesses W B correctly. If her guess is incorrect then the only thing she might learn is that her guess is incorrect. The corresponding ideal functionality is depicted in Figure 3 . Note that if dishonest A provides the "correct" input W A = W B , then F ID allows A to learn this while she may still enforce Bob to reject (by setting the "override bit" D to 0). In Appendix C, we study a slightly stronger variant, which does not allow this somewhat unfair option for A . We recall the security definition from [DFSS07] for a secure identification scheme. The definition is in the framework described in Section 4.1; thus, it considers a single execution of the protocol with an arbitrary distribution for the honest players inputs and with no input for dishonest players, and security is defined by information-theoretic conditions on the resulting output states. For consistency with the above notation (and the notation 9 The reason we study here the weaker version is that this corresponds to the security guaranteed by the definition proposed in [DFSS07] , as we show.
used in [DFSS07] ), Alice and Bob's inputs are denoted by W A and W B , respectively, rather than U and V . Furthermore, note that honest Alice's output X is empty: X = ∅.
Definition 6.1 (Secure Identification). A password-based quantum identification scheme is ε-secure (against A and B) if the following properties hold.
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, and for any joint input distribution P W A W B , Bob learns whether their input is equal, except with probability ε. Security for Alice: For any dishonest server B ∈ B, and for any distribution of W A , the resulting common output state ρ W A Y (augmented with W A ) is such that there exists a classical W that is independent of W A and such that
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user A ∈ A, and for any distribution of W B , the resulting common output state ρ W B Y X (augmented with W B ) is such that there exists a classical W independent of W B , such that if W B = W then Y = 1 with probability at most ε, and
A somewhat more natural functionality (without "override bit") can be achieved by slightly strengthening the requirements of Definition 6.1, see Appendix C. 
by the definition of F ID . Finally, we note that Y completely determines the event E := {W A = W } and therefore, we conclude using Lemma 2.3 that
Security for Bob: Consider W which is guaranteed to exist by Definition 6.1. Let us define U and X as follows. We let U = (W , D) where we define D = Y if W B = W , and else we choose D "freshly" to be 0 with probability Pr[Y = 0|W B = W ] and to be 1 otherwise. Furthermore, we let X = (W ? = W B ). Recall that by the requirement of Definition 6.1, W is independent of Bob's input W B . Furthermore by construction, D = 0 with probability Pr[Y = 0|W B = W ], independent of the value of W B (and independent of whether W B = W or not). Thus, U is perfectly independent of W B .
Since by Definition 6.1 the probability for Bob to decide that the inputs are equal, Y = 1, does not exceed ε if W B = W , we have that
Finally, we have 
Putting things together, we obtain
where we used Lemma 2.1 and 2.3 in the last step.
Another Example: Randomized 1-2 Oblivious Transfer
Figure 4 below shows the ideal functionality for sender-randomized 1-2 OT. It takes no input from Alice and an input bit C from Bob, and it outputs two random -bit strings S 0 and S 1 to Alice and an -bit string Y which stands for the string of his choice S C to Bob. Note that it allows a dishonest Alice to influence the distribution of S 0 and S 1 , and a dishonest Bob to influence the distribution of S C ; but this is good enough for many applications, in particular to build a regular (non-randomized) 1-2 OT in the standard manner.
We recall the security definition of randomized 1-2 OT from [DFR + 07]. The definition is in the framework described in Section 4.1 and considers a single execution of the protocol with an arbitrary distribution for honest Bob's input bit and no input for the dishonest players. For consistency with common notation, we denote Bob's input V by C (whereas Alice input is empty), and Alice's outputs by X = (S 0 , S 1 ).
Definition 7.1 (Rand 1-2 OT ). A randomized 1-2 OT protocol is ε-secure (against A and B) if the following properties hold.
Correctness: If Alice and Bob are honest, then for any distribution of Bob's input C, S 0 and S 1 are ε-close to random and independent of C, and Y = S C except with probability ε. Security for Alice: For any dishonest B ∈ B, the resulting common output state ρ S 0 S 1 Y allows a classical binary C such that
Functionality F 12ROT
Honestly behaving Alice and Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice and a choice bit C ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F 12ROT samples two random and independent strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ {0, 1} , and sends S 0 and S 1 to Alice and S C to Bob.
Honest Alice and dishonest Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice and a bit C ∈ {0, 1} and a string S C ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F 12ROT samples a random independent string S 1−C ∈ {0, 1} , and sends S 0 and S 1 to Alice.
Dishonest Alice and honest Bob: Upon receiving two strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and a bit C ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F 12ROT sends S C to Bob. Security for Bob: For any dishonest A ∈ A, and for any distribution of C, the resulting common output state ρ X CY (augmented with C) allows classical S 0 , S 1 such that
Note that the correctness condition in Definition 7.1 is somewhat stronger than the correctness condition in the definition proposed in [DFR + 07], which merely requires that Y = S C except with probability ε. We point out that this difference is not crucial for Proposition 7.2 below to hold. Indeed, if Y = S C is guaranteed with high probability, then correctness as in Definition 7.1 can be bootstrapped from the security properties for dishonest players, albeit with some loss in the error probability: security for Bob guarantees that the distribution of (S 0 , S 1 ) is close to independent of C, and security for Alice guarantees that the distribution of S 0 , which is close to the distribution of S 0 conditioned on C = 1, is random and independent of S 1 (conditioned on C = 1 or not), and similar for S 1 . Working out the details is tedious 10 and does not give any new insight. In most circumstances, such an argument is not even needed. For any given protocol, the correctness condition of Definition 4.1 can typically be trivially verified by inspection.
Proposition 7.2. A quantum protocol satisfying Definition 7.1 4ε-securely implements F 12ROT according to Definition 4.1.
Proof. Correctness follows immediately. Security for Alice: Consider C which is guaranteed to exist by Definition 7.1. Let us define V = (C, S C ) and Y = ∅. As Alice's input U is empty, V is trivially independent of U . Note that,
by the definition of F 12ROT . Finally, by the third claim of Lemma 2.1,
from which it follows, by Lemma 2.2, that
Security for Bob: Consider S 0 , S 1 which is guaranteed to exist by Definition 7.1. Let us define U = (S 0 , S 1 ) and X = ∅. ρ S 0 S 1 X C ≈ ε ρ S 0 S 1 X ⊗ ρ C in particular implies that
Finally, by Lemma 2.1,
The last claim follows from the following observation.
where 0 ≤ rest ≤ 1, and similarly for δ ρ CS C S 0 S 1 X , ρ CS C ↔S 0 S 1 ↔X . Subtracting the two terms results in a value that is upper bounded by P [Y = S C ] ≤ ε in absolute value.
Conclusion
We proposed a general security definition for quantum protocols in terms of simple quantum-information-theoretic conditions and showed that quantum protocols fulfilling the definition do their job as expected when used as subroutines in a larger classical protocol. The restriction to classical "outer" protocols fits our currently limited ability for executing quantum protocols, but can also be appreciated in that our security conditions pose the minimal requirements for a quantum protocol to be useful beyond running it in isolation.
[ 
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
We show that ρ X↔Y ↔ZE ≈ ε ρ X↔Y Z↔E , the first claim then follows by triangle inequality. Since quantum operations do not increase the trace distance, tracing out register E in ρ XY ZE and ρ XY ZE := ρ X↔Y ↔ZE implies that
By elementary properties of the trace distance, it follows that
The second claim follows by letting Y be "empty". The third claim holds because by the triangle inequality, we have
and we can then use the second claim.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
By elementary properties of the trace distance, 
where we used in the third equality that for y ∈ Y E , it follows from the assumption over the event that ρ 
B Other Variants of Oblivious Transfer
In this section, we give analogous "minimal" requirements for composability of other variants of oblivious transfer. It has been shown [Cré87] that all these variants of oblivious transfer are equivalent and universal for secure two-party function evaluation [Kil88] . In fact, the results of this paper show that if the variants are implemented by a quantum protocol according to our security definitions, these classical results still hold.
B.1 Regular (Non-Randomized) 1-2 OT Figure 5 shows the ideal functionality for the standard (non-randomized) 1-out-of-2 String-OT. It takes two input strings S 0 and S 1 of bits each from Alice and an input bit C from Bob, and it outputs an -bit string Y which stands for the string of his choice S C to Bob.
Functionality F 12OT : Upon receiving S 0 , S 1 ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and a choice bit C ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F 12OT sends S C to Bob. The definition is in the framework described in Section 4.1 and considers a single execution of the protocol with an arbitrary distribution for honest Bob's input bit and no input for the dishonest players. For consistency with common notation, we denote Alice's input U by (S 0 , S 1 ) and Bob's input V by C.
Definition B.1 (1-2 OT ). A 1-2 OT protocol is ε-secure if the following properties hold.
Correctness: If Alice and Bob are honest, then for any joint distribution of Alice's inputs S 0 , S 1 and Bob's input C, it holds that Bob's output Y = S C except with probability ε. Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then for any dishonest Bob and any distribution of Alice's inputs S 0 , S 1 , Alice does not get any output and the common output state ρ S 0 S 1 Y allows a classical binary C such that ρ S 0 S 1 C ≈ ε ρ S 0 S 1 ⊗ ρ C and ρ S 1−C S C CY ≈ ε ρ S 1−C ↔S C C↔Y . Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then for any dishonest Alice and any distribution of Bob's input C, the common output state ρ X CY allows classical S 0 , S 1 such that
Proposition B.2. A quantum protocol satisfying Definition B.1 3ε-securely implements F 12OT according to Definition 4.1.
Proof. Correctness follows immediately. Security for Alice: Consider C which is guaranteed to exist by Definition B.1. Let us define V = C and Y = S C . By the first requirement in the definition, we have that Alice's input S 0 , S 1 is ε-close to independent of C.
Furthermore, it holds by definition that
Finally, by the second requirement in the definition and Lemma 2.2, we have that
Security for Bob: as in the proof of Proposition 7.2.
B.2 Fully Randomized 1-2 OT
Figure 6 below shows the ideal functionality for fully randomized 1-2 String-OT (sometimes also called Oblivious Key OK). It takes no input from the players and outputs two random -bit strings S 0 and S 1 to Alice, a random choice bit C and S C to Bob. Note that it allows a dishonest Alice to influence the distribution of S 0 and S 1 , and a dishonest Bob to influence the distribution of S C ; but this is good enough for many applications, in particular to build a regular (non-randomized) 1-2 OT in the standard manner.
Honestly behaving Alice and Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice and Bob, F 12OK samples two random and independent strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ R {0, 1} and a choice bit C ∈ R {0, 1}, and sends S 0 , S 1 to Alice and C, S C to Bob.
Honest Alice and dishonest Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice and a bit C ∈ {0, 1} and a string S C ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F 12OK samples a random independent string S 1−C ∈ R {0, 1} , and sends S 0 and S 1 to Alice.
Dishonest Alice and honest Bob: Upon receiving two strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and no input from Bob, F 12OK samples a random bit C ∈ R {0, 1} and sends C, S C to Bob. The following definition is in the framework described in Section 4.1 and considers a single execution of the protocol with no inputs for honest or dishonest players. For consistency with common notation, we denote Alice's output X by (S 0 , S 1 ) and Bob's output by (C, Y ). Correctness: If Alice and Bob are honest, then S 0 , S 1 and C are ε-close to random and independent, and Y = S C except with probability ε. Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then for any dishonest Bob, the common output state ρ S 0 S 1 Y allows a classical binary C such that ρ S 1−C S C CY ≈ ε 1 2 I ⊗ ρ S C CY . Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then for any dishonest Alice, the common output state ρ X CY allows classical S 0 , S 1 such that Pr Y = S C ≥ 1 − ε and
Proposition B.4. A quantum protocol satisfying Definition B.3 4ε-securely implements F 12OK according to Definition 4.1.
Proof. Correctness follows immediately. Security for Alice: as in Proposition 7.2. Security for Bob: Consider S 0 , S 1 which is guaranteed to exist by Definition 7.1. Let us define Alice's input U = (S 0 , S 1 ) and Alice's output X = ∅. The requirement ρ S 0 S 1 X C ≈ ε ρ S 0 S 1 X ⊗ I/2 in particular implies that P S 0 S 1 C ≈ ε P S 0 S 1 P U . Furthermore, it is easy to see that
B.3 Randomized Rabin OT Figure 7 shows the ideal functionality for (randomized) Rabin Oblivious Transfer. It samples a uniform random bit C ∈ R {0, 1} and a string S ∈ R {0, 1} . It outputs S to Alice, C to Bob and in case C = 1, also S is output to Bob. If C = 0, Bob receives the all-0 string.
Honestly behaving Alice and Bob: Upon receiving no input from the players, F RabinOT samples S ∈ {0, 1} and C ∈ R {0, 1} and sends X := S to Alice and C, Y := C · S to Bob.
Honest Alice and dishonest Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice and a string S ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F RabinOT samples a random independent bit C and outputs it to Bob. If C = 1, F RabinOT sends X = S to Alice. If C = 0, F RabinOT samples a new string S ∈ R {0, 1} and sends X = S to Alice.
Dishonest Alice and honest Bob: Upon receiving a string S ∈ {0, 1} from Alice and no input from Bob, F RabinOT samples a bit C ∈ R {0, 1} and sends C, C · S to Bob and no output to Alice. The following definition is in the framework described in Section 4.1 and considers a single execution of the protocol with no inputs for honest or dishonest players. For consistency with common notation, we denote Bob's output by (C, Y ).
Definition B.5 (Rabin OT). A randomized Rabin-OT protocol is ε-secure if the following properties hold.
Correctness: If Alice and Bob are honest, then X and C are ε-close to random and independent and Y = C · X except with probability ε.
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest, then for any dishonest Bob, the common output state ρ XY allows a classical binary C such that ρ XC ≈ ε ρ X ⊗ I/2 and ρ XCY |C=0 ≈ ε I/2 ⊗ ρ CY |C=0 . Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then for any dishonest Alice, the common output state ρ X CY allows a classical S such that Y = C · S except with probability ε and ρ CSX ≈ ε I/2 ⊗ ρ SX .
Proposition B.6. A quantum protocol satisfying Definition B.5 5ε-securely implements F RabinOT according to Definition 4.1.
Proof. Correctness follows immediately. Security for Alice: Consider C which is guaranteed to exist by Definition B.5. Let us define Bob's input V := X if C = 1. In case C = 0, sample V ∈ R {0, 1} . Let Bob's output be Y = (C, C · V ). As Alice has no input U = ∅, Bob's input V is trivially independent of U . Furthermore, the definition requires C to be ε-close to independent from X and to completely random. In case C = 1, F RabinOT outputs (1, Y ) = (1, 1 · V ) = (1, 1 · X) to Bob and X to Alice. In case C = 0, Bob receives (0, 0) and Alice's output X is independent of Bob's input V . Hence,
From ρ XCY |C=0 ≈ ε I/2 ⊗ρ CY |C=0 follows by third claim of Lemma 2.1 that ρ XCY |C=0 ≈ 4ε ρ X↔C↔Y |C=0 , and as V is sampled at random, also ρ XV CY |C=0 ≈ 4ε ρ X↔V C↔Y |C=0 holds. It follows that Security for Bob: Consider S which is guaranteed to exist by Definition B.5. Let us define Alice's input to be U := S and let Alice's output X be empty. As Bob does not have input V = ∅, Alice's U is trivially independent of V . Furthermore, since C is ε-close to uniformly random and independent of S and Y = C · S except with probability ε, we have (S, ∅, ∅, (C, Y )) ≈ 2ε (S, ∅, F RabinOT (S, ∅)) .
From ρ CSX ≈ ε I/2 ⊗ ρ SX follows that ρ CSX ≈ 2ε ρ C ⊗ ρ SX and therefore by Lemma 2.1, ρ CSX ≈ 4ε ρ C↔S↔X . As Y = C · S except with probability ε, we have by Lemma 2.2 that ρ ∅CY S∅X ≈ 5ε ρ CY ↔S↔X .
C Secure Identification without Unfairness
The goal of this section is to provide a slightly stronger functionality for secure identification than the one presented in Section 6. It is stronger in that we do not allow dishonest Alice to make Bob reject while she learns whether W A = W B or not, but we still allow Alice to make Bob reject all the time by inputting a symbol ⊥ that never agrees with Bob's input, see Figure 8 . In order to achieve this functionality, we have to impose a slightly stricter security definition than Definition 6.1.
The definition is in the framework described in Section 4.1; thus, it considers a single execution of the protocol with an arbitrary distribution for the honest players inputs and with no input for dishonest players, and security is defined by information-theoretic conditions on the resulting output states. For consistency with the above notation (and the notation used in [DFSS07] ), Alice and Bob's inputs are denoted by W A and W B , respectively, rather than U and V . Furthermore, note that honest Alice's output X is empty: X = ∅.
Definition C.1 (Secure Identification). A password-based quantum identification scheme is ε-secure if the following properties hold.
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, Bob learns whether their input is equal, except with probability ε. Security for Alice: For any dishonest server B ∈ B, and for any distribution of W A , the resulting common output state ρ The only difference to Definition 6.1 from [DFSS07] is that we additionally require for the security for Bob, that he accepts in case that W B = W . This small change allows us to achieve a more natural functionality compared to the case where we leave undefined what happens in case W B = W . We note that the protocol proposed in [DFSS07] fulfills also this strengthened Definition C.1. In
Step 5 of their protocol, if dishonest Alice sends a string Z which is inconsistent with any of the possible strings S j corresponding to Bob's passwords, W is set to ⊥. This W is independent of W B and as Bob always rejects, dishonest Alice does not learn any additional information about W B .
Proposition C.2. A quantum protocol satisfying Definition C.1 ε-securely implements the functionality F ID from Figure 8 according 
